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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Bar asserts

in its brief

that Calder

is somehow

improperly asking the Court " . . .

to focus on the trees in the

hope it will not see the forest."

(Brief at 75),

This is only

the central thrust of Calderfs appeal is indeed to

partly true:

have the Court review the individual factual components of this
case and conclude that they do not support the Bar's recommendation of disbarment; to say, however, this process is calculated
to obscure the big picture

is without merit.

It is precisely

because the forest can never be greater than the sum total of its
trees that the Bar becomes defensive about the nature and extent
of

Calder1s

focus

—

a focus designed

to expose

a number

of

structural flaws in the Bar's Findings themselves and in the process by which a number of seemingly innocuous and unrelated facts
are cleverly crafted into superficially plausible, but decidedly
misleading Findings,
These flaws, the most salient of which are addressed in
this reply, require the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations
to be vacated.

If they are not, the Bar will have successfully

removed one of its members for conduct that it never adequately
identified,

on

evidence

with which

person could be satisfied.
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no

reasonable,

fair-minded

ARGUMENT
I.

THE PANEL IMPROPERLY RELIED UPON EVIDENCE OF
CALDER'S POST-1986 CONDUCT IN ISSUING ITS
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS,
Recognizing that the Complaints are devoid of any alle-

gations regarding Calder's post-1986 conduct, the Bar seeks to
justify its Panel's reliance on such conduct by arguing that the
Complaints' mention of pre-1986 conduct placed Calder on sufficient

notice of

alleged

its

intent

to disbar

him

for conduct

nowhere

in the Complaints; that the failure of Calder's former

counsel to object to the introduction of some of the conduct permits the Complaints

to be amended to conform to the evidence;

and, that even though the Panel admitted such evidence because it
went to Calder's "state of mind/1 it can now also be relied upon
on issues such as Calder's credibility, Calder's competence and
the "issue of sanctions."

(Brief at 16, 17).

These arguments,

however, miss the mark.
First, the gravamen of both Complaints is that Calder
failed to adequately protect his clients' interests and engaged
in conduct until 1986 that further eroded those interests.

What-

ever else can be said about the Panel's unarticulated intent to
explore Calder's post-1986
bankruptcies,

conduct

in connection with his own

it undeniably prejudiced Calder by giving him no

advance indication that the Panel's only conclusions of dishonesty and fraud would be those based upon his 1988 conduct.
as the Bar asserts, "Calder's conduct

If,

in his personal bankrupt-

cies was inextricably connected with the factual allegations and
disciplinary

rule

violations

set
-2-

forth

in

the [Complaints],"

Brief at 24, why did the Bar studiously refrain from alleging in
the Complaints, even in conclusory fashion, the existence of this
11

inextricable connection?11

manufactured
Calder:

and

dispensed

By so refraining, the Bar effectively
the

gravest

possible

prejudice

to

springing on him without warning an excursion into con-

duct nowhere expressed in the Complaints.

The presence of such

unfair prejudice precludes any finding that Calder impliedly consented to the trying of such

issues.

The plain fact remains:

had the Bar wanted to impose sanctions on the basis of post-1986
conduct, it could easily have expressed its intent to do so.
matter how vigorously

the Bar now seeks to recharacterize

No
its

Complaints, the Complaints are devoid of any intention to challenge the sufficiency of Calder's disclosures to the bankruptcy
court in connection with his own personal bankruptcy filings.
Next, Calderfs former counsel expressly objected to the
Panel's consideration of the bankruptcy court's memorandum decision and order dated December 27, 1988.

(Tr. 179-83).

In urging

the Panel to overrule the objection, the Bar's prosecutor (after
initially arguing that the evidence bore on both Calder's competence and mental state, see Tr. 180), narrowed the rationale for
his attempted introduction of the Order to the assertion that it
went to Calder's "state of mind." (Tr. 182).

It was on this nar-

row basis that the Panel decided to admit the Order.

1

(Tr. 183).

It should be noted here that the alleged failure of Calderfs
former counsel to conduct formal discovery is irrelevant to the
disposition of this issue. Calder was entitled to rely on the
content of the four corners of the Complaints — Complaints that
expressly confined the Bar's inquiry to pre-1987 conduct.
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Despite

the

admitted,

clearly

limited

purpose

for

which

the

Order

was

the Bar now argues that the Order could properly be

relied upon by the Panel on issues such as Calder's credibility,
Calderfs competence and Calder's sanctions, (Brief at 17).

This

argument, however, highlights the dangerous, prejudicial effect
of this evidence on Calder.
make substantive

It served to allow the Panel to

findings of dishonesty and fraud without ever

apprising Calder that this was its intent.

By subtley transform-

ing

was

the purposes

"state

of

mind"

for
to

which

the evidence

"competence"

and

offered

—

from

"credibility"—the

Panel

deprived Calder of any realistic chance of addressing and refuting the merits of the Panel's evidence.

This is the essence of

unfair prejudice.
In the seemingly

inconceivable event

that this Court

affirms the Panel's power to use Calder's post-1986 conduct as a
substantive basis for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions,
there are a variety of specific reasons why the Panel's factual
findings do not justify disbarment:

(i) the "undisclosed assets"

on which the bankruptcy court based its order denying Calder a
discharge

in

bankruptcy

—

an

order

that

is

currently

on

appeal -- were comprised of two bank accounts containing no more

2

This Court has long held that it is improper to admit evidence
of bankrupty for the purpose of impeaching credibility. Bullock
v. Unqricht, 538 P.2d 190, 192 (Utah 1975). The Panel's consideration of this and all of the other evidence relating to
Calder's bankruptcy conduct to assess Calder's credibility constitutes reversible error. Its admission is anything other than
harmless error. See e.g. , Finding Nos. K g ) and (o), 2(n), 3 and
9 and Conclusion Nos. 1(d) and 2(b).
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than $5.00 and a worthless mineral interest; (ii) by order dated
November 14, 1989, the United States District Court for the District

of

court's
motion

Utah
order

to

in

dated

convert

proceeding;

case

no.

C-89-59W

November

his

18,

Chapter

reversed

1988

which

7 proceeding

the

bankruptcy

denied
to

a

(iii) while the validity of Calder's

Calder's

Chapter

13

transfer of

assets was originally challenged by Calder's Chapter 7 bankruptcy
trustee,

terminated
4
court's reversal of the conversion order.
II.

this

challenge

has

been

by

the

federal

BECAUSE THE PANEL, LIKE CALDER AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES ITSELF, MISAPPREHENDED THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE 1979 VERSION OF S 41-12-15 OF THE UTAH MOTOR VEHICLE
ACT, ALL OF ITS FINDINGS RELATING TO THE
BAILEY CASE MUST BE VACATED.
The Bar, apparently recognizing that the 1979 version

of Utah Code Ann. S 41-12-15 did not enable Bailey to obtain a
new driver's

license simply by obtaining

a discharge

in bank-

ruptcy, now seeks for the first time on appeal to introduce evidence in the form of affidavits from two employees of the Department

of Motor

Vehicles.

(See App.

to Respondent's

Brief).

3 A copy of this order is attached as App. 1. In light of
recently entered order, none of the Findings, Conclusions or
ommendations can properly be based upon the temporary and
discredited "fact" that Calder's motion to convert had
denied.
4

this
Recnow
been

Moreover, there is nothing in the existing factual record
relating to Calder's level of solvency on the date of the alleged
transfers — a necessary element to avoid such a transfer. Without such evidence, there can be no prima facie determination that
the alleged transfers were in any way improper.
See 11 U.S.C.
5 548, a copy of which is attached as App. 2.
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These affidavits were never offered, admitted or considered at
trial and are not reflective of any testimony adduced at trial,
Calder accordingly moves the Court to strike this improper "evidence. "
Next, while Calder readily agrees that his " . . . minimal obligation was to so advise

[Bailey] so Bailey could take

other appropriate steps to renew his driver's license," Brief at
27, the plain fact remains that neither of the Bar's Complaints
attempted to sanction Calder for this alleged failure.
Calder cannot

As such,

now be sanctioned on the basis of conduct

never

alleged in the Complaint and not directly addressed at trial,
III.

MANY OF THE PANEL'S
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
A.

Findings

Bailey Case,

regarding

FACTUAL

FINDINGS

ARE

Reduced to its bare essentials, the

the Bailey

case

are

that Calder

agreed

to

amend Bailey's bankruptcy schedules to discharge an inadvertently
omitted

judgment;

that Calder

failed

to conform with

Bailey's

understanding of the terms and conditions on which that effort
was to be undertaken; that after failing to effect an amendment,
Calder withdrew as Bailey's counsel; that during the course of
Bailey's case against him, Calder filed a false affidavit served
months before Bailey was ultimately no caused at trial; and, that
as

a

result

of

Calder's

failure

to

effect

an

amendment

to

Bailey's bankruptcy schedules, Bailey was unable to obtain a new
driver's license.
tours of

Calder does not disagree with the general con-

this recitation.

However, he cannot

-6-

agree

that

the

evidence on several key issues clearly and convincingly establishes his ethical culpability.
1.

Finding No. 1(a).

Wholly apart

from the

legal impossibility that Calder1s failure to obtain a discharge
of the $1,400 judgment debt precluded Bailey from obtaining a
Utah driver's license, the record does establish Calder's misapprehension

about

the

then-existing

legal

41-12-15 of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act.

effect

of

Section

The record further

establishes the effort Calder undertook unsuccessfully to obtain
a discharge of the judgment debt.
subsequent

Findings

However, because many of the

are derivative

of, and

based

upon, the

premise that Bailey's procural of a discharge would of itself
insured his qualification for a new driver's license, any appellate revision of this Finding will, of necessity, affect subsequent Findings and Conclusions.
2.
(p).

Finding Nos. K b ) , (c), (d), (e), (k) and

These Findings are premised on the notion that the agree-

ment that Bar Counsel, Jeff Paoletti, reached with Bailey and
subsequently

sought

to

impart

to Calder was so clearly and

cogently expressed as to make Calder ethically culpable if he did
not follow it. Mr. Paoletti's obvious lack of accurate recollection, see Tr. 122-35, and his unfortunate decision not to provide
Calder with any written memorial of the agreement he had reached
with Bailey, see Tr. 128-29 and 137-38, precludes these Findings
from being sustained on appeal.
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B.

Job Case.
1.

Finding

No.

2(b).

In

their

response

to

Calder1s challenge to this Finding, the Bar asserts that Job testified that he gave Calder the case number and case name of the
Pocklinqton case.

(Brief at 53).

support that assertion.
of the transcript
whether

he gave

However, an examination of that portion

establishes
that

It cites to pages 199-200 to

that Job had no recollection of

information

to Calder

in November,

1983

(when the bankruptcy petition was originally filed) or later in
May, 1984 (when Calder had undeniably acquired knowledge of the
Pocklinqton case).

This distinction is significant

in that the

testimony nowhere establishes Calder's knowledge that at the time
Job's Chapter 7 petition was filed, Job had already

filed the

Pocklinqton case.
Therefore, while the record undeniably establishes that
Job provided Calder with some information regarding a possible
claim

that

he had against

that

Calder

intentionally

Pocklington,
omitted

it nowhere

the claim.

establishes

Even when

this

finding is viewed in the light most favorable to its affirmance,
it can stand for no more than the proposition that Calder was not
sensitive to the full dimensions of the claim and should not have
accepted at face value Job's description of the claim.

However,

the evidence does not establish Calder's actual knowledge of the
nature and extent of the claim and his willful nondisclosure of
that knowledge, as suggested by this Finding.
2.
the

3ar

accuses

Finding No. 2(c).
Calder

of

focusing
-8-

In defending this Finding,
too

narrowly

on

Job's

testimony.

(Brief at 55).

However, a fair reading of pages 144

and 150-52 of the trial transcript establishes nothing more than
Job's self-contradiction regarding whether Calder ever mentioned
to Job the option of filing a Chapter 13 at the time Calder was
initially retained.
3.

Finding No. 2(d).

To support this Finding,

the Bar devotes two pages to an incomprehensible discussion of
distinctions without differences.

What the Bar seems to be say-

ing is that although Calder could validly file a Chapter 13 petition for Job in the absence of Job's present ability to earn a
regular

income, the filing could not be upheld

Job's prior Chapter
belied

by Judge

7 petition.

Boulden's

in the face of

That contention

testimony

at page

is, however,

690 of

the trial

transcript (to the effect that Chapter 13 plans can be based upon
prospective

income) and Job's own testimony at page 152 of the

trial transcript (to the effect that he did in fact have the prospective ability to produce such income).

In light of this tes-

timony and the Panel's own announcement that it could not sanction Calder on this issue, Calder is at a loss to understand how
this Finding can be sustained.
4.

Finding No. 2(e).

This Finding recites that

Calder withdrew from representing Job without Job's consent and
knowledge and that at the time of his withdrawal, Calder knew
that it would be difficult for Job to obtain new counsel.
Bar's

response

to Calder's detailed

attack on this Finding

is

that

it is supported by "uncontroverted

58).

This assertion is, however, clearly refuted by the evidence
-9-

evidence."

The

(Brief at

marshalled

at pages

58-61 of Calder's appellant's brief.

The

Bar's citation to page 428-29 of the trial transcript

for the

proposition

finding

that Calder knew Job would have difficulty

new counsel is inaccurate.

This portion of the transcript estab-

lishes that Job had the ability to make payments under a Chapter
13 plan based on the prospective
could produce.

(Tr. 152).

income that he told Calder he

It does not support even an inference

that Job would have trouble finding new counsel.
5.
Finding

on

the

Finding No. 2(g). Calder's challenge to this
basis

that

it

overbroadly

recites

that

Job

received no relief during the ten month period during which Job's
bankruptcy petitions were
"hair

splitting."

indicative

of

unqualified,

(Brief

the many

in effect
at

59).

factual

unconditional

is labeled by the Bar as
However,

findings

this

couched

"fact", which upon

Finding
in

first

terms

is
of

impression

induce the reader to believe that a general fact has been established when, in fact, it has not.

As the Bar correctly acknowl-

edges in its response, the Finding would be more accurate if it
reflected that Job did not obtain any "ultimate" relief from his
debts.

id.

As such, this Finding and any resulting Conclusions

must be appropriately modified.
6.

Finding

No.

2(h).

Calder

appreciates

the

Bar's assurance that this Finding was not intended to imply that
Job's loss of home was attributable to Calder's action or inaction.

(Brief at 60).

After receiving that assurance and being

chided for taking exception to any implication that he may have
been so responsible, the Bar then proceeds to state that ". . . a
-10-

reasonable inference can be drawn that Job's difficulty was due
to Calder's

improper

withdrawal,

protection of counsel."
ence that

Id.

leaving

him without

It is precisely this type of infer-

is contradicted by Job's own testimony set

pages 62 and 63 of Calder!s appellant's brief.
establishes beyond doubt
the

legal

cause

of

adequate

forth on

That testimony

that Calder could never be considered

the Job's

loss

of

home,

as

this

Finding

clearly implies.
7.

Finding

No.

2(i).

In

seeking

to

answer

Calderfs query as to why he would have any incentive not to disclose

the

existence

of

all

creditors

of

which

he

was

aware

(because that failure would preclude Calder from obtaining any
relief from the debt owed to the creditor), the Bar speculates
that one possible incentive would be to forum shop and keep the
adjudication of the claim away from the bankruptcy court.
at

61).

This speculation

is just

that:

it

(Brief

is devoid of any

colorable support in the record and wholly ignores the question
of why the reality of receiving a discharge of $55,000 of debt
would be lightly sacrificed for the mere acquisition of a supposedly better forum.

The Court should decline the Bar's invitation

to participate

such

because

there

in

speculation

is no plausible

and

reason

should

determine

for Calder's

that

intentional

omission of the debt, the omission must have been the product of
inadvertence.
8/
that

Calder

Finding Nos. 2(m) and

presented

no

evidence

(n).

establishing

The Bar states
any

"factual

basis" for making the assertions in the affidavit dated July 18,
-11-

1985.

(Brief at 68).

However, by definition, Calder's asser-

tions in the affidavit were couched in hypothetical terms and did
not

purport

to be

founded

in

fact.

Therefore,

while

Calder

acknowledges the irresponsibility of including such assertions in
a court-filed document, these assertions could not, under applicable law, be perjurious as found by Finding No. 2(m).
Moreover, how these assertions can be "indicative of an
attitude of bad faith which pervades [Calder's] conduct

in con-

nection with the Utah State Bar disciplinary proceeding . . . ,"
is nowhere stated by the Panel.

Its gratuitous insertion of this

language must be vacated and its reliance on section 9.22(f) of
the ABA's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions —

a section

that was never relied upon by the Panel in issuing its ruling

—

must be rejected.
9.

Finding No. 2(o).

As the Bar notes, Calder

readily admitted making a number of transfers to his wife and
brother after Judge Frederick orally rendered his judgment in the
Job

malpractice

action.

uncontroverted fact.

(Brief

at

67).

This

is

indeed

While the Finding is devoid of any mention

that the transfers were made in bad faith, the Bar is quick to
label them as such in its brief.
prehend

Id.

What the Bar fails to com-

is that absent affirmative evidence regarding

Calder's

level of solvency at the time of the transfers, there is no principled basis on which an inference of bad faith can be drawn.
See 11 U.S.C. § 548.

Moreover, the pending adversary proceeding

identified in this Finding has been terminated as a result of the
federal

district

court's

recent

order

-12-

reversing

Judge

Allen's

denial of Calder's right to convert his Chapter 7 case to a Chapter 13 case.

This Finding accordingly must be vacated.
10.

Finding

No.

3.

The

Bar's

Calder's challenge to this Finding is unpersuasive.

response

to

Wholly apart

from the Panel's deviation from the In Re Strong requirement that
the evidence underlying a court's Finding be made a part of the
disciplinary

record,

the Bar has failed to refute the reality

that there is no independent evidence in the record to establish
that Calder's intent in filing his Chapter 13 petition was ". . .
5
to frustrate the claims of Job and Bailey."
Moreover, even if
that were Calder's

intent, a debtor's

invocation of the bank-

ruptcy process entails, by definition, a delay in, or frustration
of, the payment

of claims.

The Bar should not be allowed to

sanction Calder for occupying

the status of a debtor

ruptcy seeking a fresh start —

in bank-

a fresh start that by its very

nature will always be at the expense of creditors like Job and
Bailey.
11.

Finding No. 4.

Like so many of the Findings

in this proceeding, the Panel employs the presumptively majestic
terms of
conduct.

"knowingly

intentionally"

in describing

By doing so, the Bar magically

innocuous conduct
the

and

imposition

of

into ominous-sounding
disciplinary

transforms

Calder's
otherwise

factual predicates

sanctions.

The

Court

for

should

reject this approach.

5 Indeed, the only direct evidence in the record on this issue is
just the opposite. See Tr. 784, 786-87.
-13-

12.

Finding

No, 5.

A careful

review of pages

388-403 of the trial transcript establishes no principled basis
for an inference that Calder was somehow careless
his own personal

bankruptcy

schedules,

".

credibility to Job's and Bailey's claims."

in preparing

. . thereby

giving

(Brief at 71).

And,

for the reasons stated at pages 71 and 72 of Calder's appellant's
brief,

i.e. the Bar's failure to enumerate even generally the

assets or values deemed

to constitute

an ethically

actionable

discrepancy, this Finding must fail.
13.

Finding No. 6.

For the reasons set forth at

pages 72 and 73 of Calder's appellant's brief and pages 2 and 3
of this brief, this Finding

and the Conclusions based upon it

must be vacated.
14.

Finding No. 7.

This Finding must be vacated

because of the federal district court's reversal of the November
18, 1988 order.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons

set

forth

in both this and Calder's

appellant's brief, the Court should vacate or modify the Findings
and Conclusions and reject the Recommendation.
DATED this

^?

day of December, 1989.

^\^)M*sU—

JOHN NT. ANDERSON
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that

I caused to be mailed, postage

prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF to the following on this

1^

day of December, 1989:

Christine A. Burdick, Esq.
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

\yr>_L382:122689A
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APPENDIX 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
IN RE;
J. RICHARD CALDER,
Debtor.

ORDER REVERSING ORDER
OF BANKRUPTCY COURT
Civil No:

C-89-59W

Bankr. No. 86A-03558
J. RICHARD CALDER,
Plaintiff,
-vsROGER G. SEGAL, TRUSTEE,
Defendant.

On November 18, 1988 the bankruptcy court entered its
order denying the motion of the debtor, J. Richard calder, which
had been filed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 706(a), and by which the
debtor attempted to convert his Chapter 7 case to a case under
Chapter 13. The bankruptcy court determined that it had
authority under 11 U.S.C. § 105 to deny the debtor's motion in
order to prevent the abuse of the bankruptcy process.
Appeal was taken to this court from that order and
briefs were filed by the debtor and by the trustee.
13, 1989 oral argument was heard on this appeal.

On November

The debtor was

EXHIEIT C

represented by Cy H. Castle and the trustee was represented by
Julie A, Bryan.

Prior to the hearing, the court had carefully

read all of the briefs, the pertinent statutes and many of the
authorities that had been cited by the parties•

Following oral

argument, the court took the matter under advisement and has
since then further considered the law and the facts relating to
this matter.

Being now fully advised,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the November 18, 1988
decision of the bankruptcy court is reversed.
The material facts giving rise to this appeal are as
follows:

The debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under

Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on August 19, 1986. Thereafter,
certain of the creditors in that bankruptcy filed a complaint
seeking an order denying the debtor's discharge.

By a Memorandum

Decision and Order dated September 27, 1988, the court denied the
debtor's discharge in the Chapter 7 proceedings pursuant to
§ 727(a)(4)(A) on the basis that the debtor had knowingly and
fraudulently made a false oath or account on his Schedules and
Statement of Affairs filed in the Chapter 7 case.

On October 11,

1988, the debtor filed a motion to convert his Chapter 7 case to
a Chapter 13 case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 706(a).

At a hearing

on November 18, 1988, the court announced upon the record its
order denying the debtor's motion to convert from Chapter 7 to
2

Chapter 13 and on that same date entered its written order.
It is the opinion of this court that under the
circumstances of this case that the debtor had the right pursuant
to § 706(a) to convert his Chapter 7 case to a case under Chapter
13 and that the right given to the debtor under § 706(a) could
not be defeated by the court1s general equitable powers granted
to it under 11 U.S.C. § 105.
In entering this order# this court expresses no opinion
as to whether debtor's plan as proposed under Chapter 13 must be
confirmed by the bankruptcy court.

That plan may only be

confirmed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) if it is proposed in
good faith.

All that this court by this order holds is that the

order denying conversion from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 entered on
November 18, 1988 was improperly entered.
Dated this

//^ > ~day of November, 1989.

David K. Winder
United States District Judge
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing to the following named
counsel this

fi

i

day of November, 1989.

John T. Anderson, Esq.
Cy H. Castle, Esq.
50 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Julie A. Bryan, Esq.
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor
P. 0- Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008

Secretary
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APPENDIX 2

11 USC §548
§548. Fraudulent transfers and obligations.
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest
of the debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the
debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year
before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor
voluntarily or involuntarily—
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation
with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity
to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date
that such transfer was made or such obligation was
incurred, indebted; or
(2) (A) received less than a reasonably equivalent
value in exchange for such transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, or
became insolvent as a result of such transfer or
obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction,
or was about to engage in business or a transaction,
for which any property remaining with the debtor
was an unreasonably small capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the
debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond the
debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
(b) The trustee of a partnership debtor may avoid
any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or
incurred on or within one year before the date of the filing
of the petition, to a general partner in the debtor, if the
debtor was insolvent on the date such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a
result of such transfer or obligation.
(c) Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation
voidable under this section is voidable under section 544,
545, or 547 of this title, a transferee or obligee of such a
transfer or obligation that takes for value and in good faith
has a lien on or may retain any interest transferred or may
enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may be, to the
extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the
debtor in exchange for such transfer or obligation.
(d)(1) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is
made when such transfer is so perfected that a bona fide
purchaser from the debtor against whom applicable law
permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an
interest in the property transferred that is superior to the
interest in such property of the transferee, but if such
transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of the
case, such transfer is made immediately before the date of
the filing of the petition.
(2) In this section—
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(A) "value" means property, or satisfaction or
securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor,
but does not include an unperformed promise to
furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the
debtor;
(B) P commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial inotitution, financial institution or securities clearing agency that receives a
margin payment, as defined in section 741(5) or
761(15) of this title, or settlement payment, as defined
in section 741(8) of this title, takes for value to the
extent of such payment; and
(C) a repo participant that receives a margin
payment, as defined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this
title, or settlement payment, as defined in section
741(8) of this title, in connection with a repurchase
agreement, takes for value to the extent of such
payment.

